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3. United Kingdom: the constructed threat of cyber terrorism 
 
Gareth Mott, Kent University 
 
The Emergence of Political ‘Cyberterrorism’ Discourse in Britain 
 
Although it has existed since the 1980s in a science fiction capacity1, the term 
‘cyber terrorism’ has not been conclusively defined either within academia or 
indeed amongst policymakers internationally2. There has been sustained debate as 
to what this term may mean and indeed whether we should refer to the term cyber 
terrorism at all. Nonetheless, cyber terrorism has been ‘spoken into existence’3; it 
is a social construction of a threatening phenomenon, irrespective of legitimate 
claims that cyber terrorism has not yet occurred anywhere in the world4. This paper 
draws from – and builds upon – research and findings produced in the author’s 
monograph, entitled Constructing the Cyberterrorist: Critical Reflections on the 
UK Case5, in order to articulate the manner in which British political discourse and 
legislation has ‘securitized’ the threat of cyber terrorism. To securitize an issue is 
to discursively elevate it from a ‘political’ realm, instead transposing it into an 
exceptional ‘security’ realm in which extraordinary policies may be implemented 
or reinforced6. 
 
The UK is an interesting case study in relation to the construction of the threat of 
cyber terrorism, because the legislation under which incidences of cyber terrorism 
may be prosecuted pre-exists the discursive construction of the threat. Accordingly, 
such an activity would be prosecutable under the Terrorism Act 2000 in most 
instances, which, under Section (2)(e) of its definitions of terrorism includes attacks 
that are “designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic 
system”7. An attack that may not fit the parameters of the Terrorism Act - for 
 
1 Collin, B. (1997) “The future of cyberterrorism: the physical and virtual worlds converge”, Crime and 
Justice International, pp.14-18; Collin, B. (2002) quoted in J Ballard, J Hornik and D McKenzie, 
“Technological facilitation of terrorism: definitional, legal and policy issues”, American Behavioural 
Scientist, Vol.45 No.6, pp.989-1016. 
2 Jarvis, L and S MacDonald. (2015) “What is cyberterrorism? Findings from a survey of 
researchers”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.27 No.4, pp.657-678; MacDonald, S, L Jarvis 
and S Lavis. (2019) “Cyberterrorism today? Findings from a follow-on survey of researchers”, 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 
3 Conway, M. (2005) “The media and cyberterrorism: a study in the construction of ‘reality’”, paper 
presented at the First International Conference on the Information Revolution and the Changing Face of 
International Relations and Security, Lucerne, Switzerland, 23-25 May. 
4 Kenney, M. (2015) “Cyberterrorism in a post-Stuxnet world”, Orbis, Vol.59 No.1, pp.111-128. 
5 Mott, G. (2019) Constructing the cyberterrorist: critical reflections on the UK case, London: 
Routledge. 
6 Buzan, B, O Waever and J Wilde. (1998) A new framework for analysis, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
7 Legislation.gov.uk. (2000) The Terrorism Act 2000, chapter 11, 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents, accessed on 7th March 2020; Walker, C. (2008) 
“Cyberterrorism: legal principle and the law in the United Kingdom”, Penn State Law Review, Vol.110, 
pp.625-665. 
instance, a serious or sustained attack perpetrated by a group not already included 
in the proscribed terrorist group list – could also be prosecutable under the 
Computer Misuse Act 19908. However, it is important to stress that in British 
political discourse prior to 2010, the specific term ‘cyber terrorism’ was rarely, if 
ever, used. This status quo was perhaps indicative of the perception that whilst 
cyber terrorism was a distinct possibility, it was deemed improbable. In contrast, 
the perceived threat from nation-states – in particular China and Russia – was 
greater and therefore captured discussions around the protection of key British 
interests in cyberspace. In this vein, it was not surprising to find an excerpt from 
the 2009-2010 Annual Report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which 
summarised part of a discussion with GCHQ representatives who, when questioned 
about the potential risk of cyber terrorism, dampened the threat on a relative basis9. 
 
This discursive political scene changed substantively in 2010. As has become 
standard protocol in the UK, the then-new British Coalition government published 
a new National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. By 
overtly listing the key threats facing the UK and ranking these according to their 
likelihood and their propensity for harm, these documents sought to be the public 
face of UK security priorities for the duration of the Coalition government. 
Collectively, these documents established – on a formal basis – the stature of cyber 
terrorism as a Tier One threat to the UK. ‘Tier One’ is a classification that the British 
government used to distinguish the threats to national security that – taking account 
of both likelihood and impact – were the highest priority. This Strategy specifically 
cited cyber terrorism as a serious threat to the UK. It detailed “cyber attack, 
including by other states, and by organized crime and terrorists” alongside 
‘international terrorism’, ‘international military crises’, and ‘major accidents or 
natural disasters’ as a Tier One threat to British national security10. 
 
 
8 Legislation.gov.uk. (1990) The Computer Misuse Act 1990, chapter 18, 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/19990/18/contents, accessed on 7th March 2020. The current maximum 
penalty under the CMA is ten years imprisonment and an unlimited fine. Breach of the Terrorism Act 
can receive a penalty of life imprisonment. Feasibly, in the context of the CMA, broader legislation can 
be applied, including the Homicide Act 1957 and Criminal Damage Act 1971, where harmful intent 
beyond the act of hacking can be evidenced. 
9 Intelligence and Security Committee. (2010) Intelligence and security committee annual report 
2009-2010, London: Stationary Office. The report stated that: “GCHQ informed the committee 
that it is not known whether terrorist groups intend, or have the capacity, to launch significant 
attacks over the internet but this, along with extremist use of the internet, remains an area of 
considerable concern. Nevertheless, we have been told by GCHQ the greatest threat of electronic 
attack to the UK comes from state actors, with Russia and China continued to pose the greatest 
threat”. 
10 Cabinet Office. (2010a) A strong Britain in an age of uncertainty: the national security strategy: 
London: Cabinet Office; Cabinet Office. (2010b) Securing Britain in an age of uncertainty: the strategic 
defence and security review, London: Cabinet Office. The Strategy warned that: “attacks in cyberspace 
can have a potentially devastating real-world effect. Government, military, industrial and economic 
targets, including critical services, could feasibly be disrupted by a capable adversary. ‘Stuxnet’ … was 
seemingly designed to target industrial control equipment. Although no damage to the UK has been done 
as a result, it is an example of the realities of the danger of our interconnected world). The Review 
highlighted that “the risks emanating from cyberspace (including the internet, wider telecommunications 
 
This particular construction of the cyber terrorist threat was reiterated in the UK’s 
first Cyber Security Strategy, which overtly raised the fear that the risk of terrorist 
application of significant cyber weapons was escalating11. This document also 
expressly distinguished between the general terrorist usage of online services 
(which it acknowledged were widespread) and the specific act of cyber terrorism 
itself (which it acknowledged had not yet occurred). The constructed securitization 
of the threat of cyber terrorism in the UK was reaffirmed by the updated 2015 
version of the National Security Strategy and the 2016 version of the Cyber Security 
Strategy12. It is therefore of note that these public facing security documents served 
two functions with respect to the debates around the threat of cyber terrorism in the 
UK. Firstly, the documents served to legitimize the discussion of cyber terrorism; 
this now became a bona fide part of discussions around British security in the 
contemporary networked era. Secondly, the documents also served to define the 
parameters of the debate by imposing a particular interpretation of what cyber 
terrorism is, and by process of elimination, what it is also therefore not. To be 
specific, the British construction of the threat of cyber terrorism is concerned with 
the potential use of cyber weapons by terrorist entities against critical national 
infrastructure. This is cogently distinguished from broader uses of online services 
by terrorist organizations. 
 
Elevating the Threat 
 
With the parameters of the securitization of cyber terrorism in place, between May 
2010 and June 2016 – the tenure of the Cameron Coalition and Conservative 
 
and computer systems) of one of the four Tier One risks to national security. These risks include… the 
actions of cyber terrorists … these threats… are likely to increase significantly over the next five to ten 
years as our dependence on cyberspace deepens”. 
11 Cabinet Office. (2011) The UK cyber security strategy: protecting and promoting the UK in a digital 
world, London: Cabinet Office. The Cyber Security Strategy noted that: “cyberspace is already used by 
terrorists to spread propaganda, radicalise potential supporters, raise funds, communicate and plan. While 
terrorists can be expected to continue to favour high-profile attacks, the threat that they might also use 
cyberspace to facilitate or to mount a can attacks against the UK is growing. We judge that it will 
continue to do so, especially if terrorists believe that our national infrastructure may be vulnerable”. 
12 Cabinet Office. (2015) National security strategy and strategic defence and security review 2015: a 
secure and prosperous United Kingdom, London: Cabinet Office; Cabinet Office. (2016) National cyber 
security strategy 2016-2021, London: Cabinet Office. The 2015 version of the National Security Strategy 
re-affirmed that: “the range of cyber actors threatening the UK has grown. The threat is increasingly 
asymmetric and global … nonstate actors, including terrorists and cyber criminals can use easily 
available cyber tools and technology for destructive purposes”, and that these threats were ‘significant 
and varied’, including: “cyber terrorism … and disruption of critical national infrastructure as it becomes 
more networked and dependent on technology data held overseas”. The 2016 Cyber Security Strategy 
provided a measured assessment of the escalating threat: “terrorist groups continue to aspire to conduct 
damaging cyber activity against the UK and its interests. The current technical capability of terrorists is 
judged to be low … the current assessment is that physical, rather than cyber, terrorist attacks will remain 
the priority for terrorist groups for the immediate future … the potential for a number of skilled extremist 
lone actors to emerge will also increase, as will the risk that a terrorist organisation will seek to enlist an 
established insider. Terrorists will likely use any cyber capability to achieve the maximum effect 
possible. Thus, even a moderate increase in terrorist capability may constitute a significant threat to the 
UK and its interests”. 
governments – discourse at the political level in the UK proliferated with the term 
‘cyber terrorism’ and derivates thereof13. Several key findings can be raised. 
Notably, in over 100 distinct instances in which the threat of cyber terrorism was 
raised by Ministers, MPs and peers both inside and outside of the Chambers, there 
was no dissent. No political figure disputed the perception that cyber terrorism was 
an increasing threat. In some instances, the specter of cyber terrorism was cast in 
dire terms. Delivering a public-facing speech to GCHQ in November 2015, then-
Chancellor George Osborne stated that:  
 
“the stakes could hardly be higher – if our electricity supply, or our air traffic control, or our 
hospitals were successfully attacked online, the impact could be measured not just in terms of 
economic damage but of lives lost … [so] when we talk about tackling ISIL, that means tackling 
their cyber threat as well as the threat of their guns, bombs and knives … the pace of innovation of 
cyber attack is breathtakingly fast”14. 
 
Broadly, there was a consensus view that cyber terrorism referred to hypothetical 
instances in which terrorist organizations attack critical infrastructure with cyber 
weapons; indeed, overt references to the Strategy and Review documents were 
widespread. Delivering a Cyber Crime speech in March 2013, James Brokenshire, 
then a Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Home Office noted that: 
 
“to date, terrorists have not seen cyber attack as an important means of conducting their actions, 
although of course they use the internet to radicalise, spread propaganda, disseminate violent 
extremist material and communicate with each other. But we and other governments must be very 
mindful of the fact that this could change”15. 
 
In a similar vein, Baroness Neville-Jones, speaking during a Tackling Online Jihad 
conference as the Security Minister, informed her audience that there was a 
discernible risk: 
 
“likely to grow over time and which we monitor closely, that terrorists will develop serious cyber 
attack capabilities: by this I mean the ability to commit acts of terror by hacking into critical 
infrastructure and online systems. In some form, a cyber attack attempted by terrorists, if not 
inevitable, is of so great a likelihood that we bear it in mind in developing operational 
capabilities”16. 
 
13 After June 2016 there has been a marked decline in the use of the term ‘cyber terrorism’ and 
derivatives thereof; although this may be indicative of a relative dearth of parliamentary time 
available to consider this and other issues within proposed legislation and standing orders. Since 
June 2016 there have been five instances in which the threat of cyber terrorism has been raised in 
either Chamber. These instances adhered to the same structure of the discourse that preceded them. 
14 Osborne, G. (2015) “Chancellor’s speech to GCHQ on cyber security”, Gov.uk, 17 November, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellors-speech-to-gchq-on-cyber-security, accessed on 14 
April 2020. 
15 Home Office and Brokenshire, J. (2013) “James Brokenshire speech on cyber crime”, Gov.uk, 14 
March, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/james-brokenshire-speech-on-cyber-crime, accessed 
on 14 April 2020. 
16 Neville-Jones, P. (2011) “Tackling online Jihad: Pauline Neville-Jones’s speech”, Gov.uk, 31 January, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/tackling-online-jihad-pauline-neville-joness-speech, accessed 
on 14 April 2020. 
 
Given that the threat of cyber terrorism targets technology, and is enabled by 
technology, one might expect to see references to the technology itself in the 
exhibited discourse of the threat. Significantly however, the political discourse was 
overwhelmingly interested in the identity construct of purported cyber terrorist 
actors, rather than the weapon systems themselves. The weapon systems were 
instead left in a neutral discursive space; the weapons themselves were neither good 
nor bad, and this evaluation revolved on the identity of the person or group 
deploying them17. 
 
This author proposes that the constructed (and legislated) threat of cyber terrorism 
may have some indirect implications for digital rights and/or civil liberties, 
specifically with regard to the narrowing of the available political debate. Whilst 
the UK government has intermittently exhibited discourse relating to restricting 
access to, or use of, widespread encryption technologies, in an effort to restrict their 
untrammeled use by extremist organizations and other criminals, this discourse has 
largely not amounted to significant change in policy making terms18. With respect 
to the ‘non-cyber terrorism’ parameters of the Terrorism Act 2000, there are 
documented instances in which this legislation has been used in an aggressive 
fashion that arguably disproportionately undermined the civil liberties of 
individuals, particularly with respect to the application of Schedule 719. Polling of 
the British populace has typically exhibited distinct – and persistent – sentiment on 
these issues. This polling has indicated that the British public value ‘security’ over 
‘privacy’ with respect to online matters, and, even in the wake of the 2013 Edward 
Snowden revelations (which were described by then-MI5 chief Andrew Parker as a 
‘gift’ for terrorists), the public held the view that intelligence agencies should have 
greater access to surveillance powers20. This public sentiment provided a backdrop 
 
17 Mott, G. (2019) Constructing the cyberterrorist. 
18 Travis, A. (2017) “Call for encryption ban pits Rudd against industry and colleagues”, The Guardian, 
26th March, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/26/amber-rudd-battle-tech-firms-
cabinet-whatsapp-david-davis, accessed on 7th March 2020. 
19 Bowcott, O. (2016) “Terrorism Act incompatible with human rights, court rules in David 
Miranda case”, The Guardian, 19th January, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/19/terrorism-act-incompatible-with-human-rights-
court-rules-in-david-miranda-case, accessed on 7th March 2020. Schedule 7 enables the police to 
stop, examine and detain passengers at transportation hubs. Individuals may be detained for up to 
six hours, and reasonable suspicion is not necessary. 
20 Dahlgreen, W. (2013) “Little appetite for scaling back surveillance”, Yougov, 13 October, 
https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2013/10/13/little-appetite-scaling-back-surveillance, 
accessed on 14 April 2020; Dahlgreen, W. (2015) “Broad support for increased surveillance powers”, 
Yougov, 18 January, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2015/01/18/more-surveillance-
please-were-british, accessed on 14 April 2020; Faulconbridge, G. (2013) “MI5 chief warns Snowden 
data is a ‘gift’ for terrorists”, Reuters, 8 October, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-security-
britain/mi5-chiefwarns-snowden-data-is-a-gift-for-terrorists-idUKBRE99711K20131008, accessed on 14 
April 2020; Jordan, W. (2014) “Snowden revelations ‘good for society’”, Yougov, 18 April, 
https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2014/04/18/reporting-nsa-revelations-good-society, 
accessed on 14 April 2020. 
of support for the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which consolidated and 
legitimized existing large-scale surveillance practices. 
 
However, with respect to the use of the legislation against instances of ‘terroristic’ 
electronic interference, there are few cases to speak of21 and it would be difficult to 
categorically argue that the particular British construction of the threat of cyber 
terrorism has served to restrict digital rights or civil liberties. In contrast, as the 
annual UK’s Cyber Security Breaches Survey routinely highlights, broader profit-
driven hacking directly or indirectly impacting UK organizations is prolific, to the 
extent that many attacks are not reported and not investigated22. There is, of course, 
widespread political-level discourse in the UK concerning the threat of generic 
profit-driven cybercrime. It is notable, however, that the ‘cyber terrorism’ discourse 
in the UK appears to have operated on a standalone basis, separate to ‘cybercrime’ 
or indeed ‘terrorism’ more broadly construed. This author suggests that the 
construction of the threat of cyber terrorism in the UK is pre-emptive in the sense 
that it articulates the real possibility of terrorist usage of cyber weapons against 
critical national infrastructure. The discourse is also self-reflective (although not 
self-critical), in that it insulates itself against exhibiting limited shelf life by 
exclaiming that the threat of cyber terrorism is increasing over time. The 
constructed threat is therefore reflective of the Rumsfeldian23 logic: the absence of 




This is not to say that the constructed threat does not have significant implications 
for freedom of debate and dissemination of knowledge in the UK. It is of note that 
the UK political discourse left the cyber weaponry itself in a neutral space; focusing 
instead on the ‘bad’ actors who may or may not deploy them. This has important 
ramifications in terms of legitimizing particular practices and also in silencing 
 
21 In May 2017, British media outlets reported the successful prosecution of a ‘cyber terrorist’, Samata 
Ullah. Ullah, an autistic man from Cardiff, was sentenced to an eight-year term for distributing sensitive 
materials in USB cufflinks and advising suspected terrorist figures in Kenya about online anonymity. The 
Times and the Evening Standard labelled him a ‘new and dangerous breed of terrorist’, a ‘cyber 
terrorist’; The Sun labelled him a ‘James Bond Jihadi’. However, Ullah did not conduct any known 
cyberattacks per se. See Simpson, J and D Gardham. (2017) “ISIS hacker who hid terror files on 
cufflinks is jailed”, The Times, 3 May, www.thetimes.co.uk/article/isis-hacker-who-hid-terror-fileson-
cufflinks-is-jailed-t8008sqph, accessed on 7th March 2020; Mitchell, J. (2017) “Jailed: cyberterrorist 
Samata Ullah who used James Bond-style cufflinks to hide ISIS propaganda”, Evening Standard, 2nd 
May, www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/jailed-cyberterrorist-samata-ullah-who-used-james-bondstyled-
cufflinks-tohide-isis-propaganda-a3528451.html, accessed on 7th March 2020; Lake, E. (2017) “Cuff 
him: ‘James Bond Jihadi’ Samata Ullah who used cyber cufflinks to hide ISIS data and was branded new 
breed of terrorist is caged”, The Sun, 2nd May, www.thesun.co.uk/news/3459144/james-bond-jihadi-
samata-ullah-who-used-cybercufflinks-to-hide-isis-data-and-was-branded-new-breed-of-terrorist-is-
caged/, accessed on 7th March 2020. 
22 Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. (2019) Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2019, 
London: Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. 
23 Rumsfeld, D. (2002) “Press conference by US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld”, NATO, 7th 
June, https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm, accessed on 7th March 2020. 
debates that might otherwise be warranted. The UK was one of the first countries 
in the world to recognize that it rigorously develops a cyber offensive arsenal24, but 
we have not had a public facing debate about the rationale and proportionality of 
these weapon systems. Cyber weapons are unlike any other weapon system. They 
do not weigh anything, they can be disseminated at the speed of light, they can be 
replicated with very little cost. They can also leak, to potentially devastating 
effect25. By ‘securitizing’ the threat of cyber terrorism, the UK political discourse 
arguably serves to legitimize UK state-oriented cyber weapon practices, whilst at 
the same time avoiding public-facing scrutiny of, and debate around, the weapon 
systems themselves. As British society becomes increasingly networked, with IT 
systems penetrating deeper into both the national economy and our daily lives, we 
may reach a point at which the (tacit) avoidance of a rational and mature public 



















24 Blitz, J. (2013) “UK becomes first state to admit to offensive cyber attack capability”, Financial 
Times, 29th September, https://www.ft.com/content/9ac6ede6-28fd-11e3-ab62-00144feab7de, accessed 
on 7th March 2020. 
25 In April 2017, 300mb of cyber exploits for legacy Windows operating systems that had been 
developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) were released by the ‘Shadow Brokers’, who had 
been drip-feeding a cache of exploits for the preceding eight months. ‘Eternalblue’, a worm, was part of 
this cache and would later be re-purposed for the ‘Wannacry’ ransomware attack that affected thousands 
of organisations in the summer of 2017. See Goodin, D. (2017) “NSA-leaking Shadow Brokers just 
dumped its most damaging release yet”, Arstechnica, 14 April, https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2017/04/nsa-leaking-shadow-brokers-just-dumped-its-most-damaging-release-yet/, accessed 
on 7th March 2020; Graham, C. (2017) “NHS cyber attack: everything you need to know about ‘biggest 
ransomware’ offensive in history”, The Telegraph, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/ 05/13/nhs-cyber-
attack-everything-need-know-biggest-ransomware-offensive/, accessed on 7th March 2020. 
